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Oil Price Shocks and Monetary Policy in Azerbaijan: Challenges and 
Opportunities
By Jeyhun Mammadov, Baku
Abstract
This article examines the transition from a fixed to a managed floating exchange regime in Azerbaijan and 
discusses the potentially stabilizing effects of monetary policy instruments on the Azerbaijani economy fol-
lowing oil price shocks. It argues that a proactive and credible fiscal policy and monetary expansion (albeit 
temporary) are indispensable measures to defend the domestic economy against external supply shocks. How-
ever, monetary expansion as a traditional approach to crisis management during recession has proven inef-
fective in the Azerbaijani case due to public panic over the possibility of further devaluation of the Azerbai-
jani currency (manat) and unofficial dollarization incentives. Faced with new challenges, the Central Bank 
of Azerbaijan adopted a tightening monetary policy to curb further devaluation of the manat, unofficial dol-
larization and inflation. However, establishing an effective monetary policy requires substantially enhanc-
ing credibility by creating a safer and sounder financial sector. In this regard, financial liberalization and 
greater ease of entry for foreign banks can lead to benefits connected with the development of the domestic 
financial system. The article also suggests that national currency devaluation has potential implications for 
the increase in exports and the inflow of import substituting foreign direct investment. However, a degree 
of uncertainty and turbulence surrounding the financial situation and weak institutional quality are barri-
ers to external funding and can exacerbate the contraction of domestic credit for the time being.
Economic Conditions and Monetary Policy
As uncertainties and volatility in the global economy 
and financial markets increased in recent years, global 
risks have arisen and economic growth in transitioning 
and developing countries has slowed down considerably 
since 2015. In particular, the decline in oil prices since 
2014 led to a sharp drop in the foreign currency income 
of oil- and gas-exporting states. This hurt the balance of 
payments and caused devaluation of the exporting states’ 
national currencies against foreign currencies, especially 
the US dollar. Meanwhile, as imported goods and ser-
vices became more costly, inflation, public panic and 
surging incentives for dollarization by private agents 
followed. In considering these issues, monetary policy 
makers in Azerbaijan have faced a number of challenges 
amid financial turmoil. The turmoil was mainly caused 
by the improper forecasting of the event and associated 
risks by the Central Bank of the Republic of Azerbai-
jan (CBA) and by the choice of an inefficient combina-
tion of monetary policy tools to respond to these events.
The first challenge facing the Central Bank of Azer-
baijan was related to the economy’s reaction to export 
price shocks starting in the 3rd quarter of 2014, followed 
by the devaluation of the Azerbaijani manat (AZN) by 
34% against the US dollar in February 2015. The CBA 
set the manat at 1.05 against the US dollar (compared 
to 0.78 in previous years) until it announced a transition 
from the so-called fixed to a managed floating exchange 
rate regime in December 2015 and adopted a dollar-euro 
basket to manage the exchange rate.
The transition was officially linked to an attempt to 
stimulate the diversification of the national economy, 
improve the international competitiveness of the domes-
tic non-oil sector, and ease tensions on fiscal and exter-
nal balances. However, though decisive, it was a long-
delayed decision. The Azerbaijani manat should have 
been devalued to some extent much earlier, i.e., before 
the negative oil price shocks hit the economy. Similarly, 
the exchange rate should have been fixed or managed 
around that depreciated level to promote international 
trade and investment, mitigate current speculative activ-
ities associated with exchange rate uncertainties and 
ensure international economic stabilization.
Notably, the fixed exchange rate regime does not 
imply that the rate will remain frozen forever, and it does 
not necessarily impede export diversification unless the 
national currency is overvalued. The exchange rate in 
a small nation with a fragile financial system like Azer-
baijan’s cannot be left completely floating; it must be 
managed (i.e., the central bank influences the exchange 
rates by buying and selling currencies). Therefore, the 
economy might also be intensely diversified under the 
so-called fixed exchange rate regime, although to a lesser 
extent. In the past decade prior to devaluation, the over-
valued level of the manat, whereby 1 US dollar equaled 
0.78 manat, was an obstacle to export diversification. As 
a more powerful tool in a fixed exchange rate regime, 
efficient government investment spending in non-oil 
production sector not only could have contributed to 
the progress of economic diversification but also could 
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have alleviated social costs associated with the sudden 
devaluation of the manat in 2015. However, the turbu-
lence in the financial and economic situation after the oil 
price shock demonstrated that “something went wrong” 
with appropriate spending during implementation of 
the economic diversification strategy aimed at improv-
ing the structure of the economy through “the develop-
ment of the non-oil industry, the expansion of opportu-
nities to use alternative and renewable energy sources, 
the development of the agrarian sector, the strength-
ening of food security, expansion and development of 
trade and types of services and the improvement of the 
foreign trade and investment structure”.1
Resorting to economic theory, I would mention 
that because general government spending decreases 
national saving, thereby causing increases in interest 
rates or revaluation of national currency, the role of 
monetary policy is to maintain the fixed exchange rate 
by increasing money supply to prevent the crowding out 
effects of government expenditures on investment and 
export. Therefore, in designing an anti-crisis manage-
ment strategy, proactive and credible fiscal policy and 
temporary monetary expansion are indispensable mea-
sures for filling the output gap in a  recession period. 
However, the traditional approach was not effective in 
the given situation due to institutional problems and 
improper prediction of external monetary shocks and 
negative externalities.
Ineffectiveness of Loose (Expansionary) 
Monetary Policy
Taking a traditional approach to crisis management after 
the oil price shock, the Central Bank (CBA) confronted 
the challenge of increasing financial contributions and 
stimulating domestic investment by dropping the refi-
nancing rate from 3.5% in 2014 to 3% in the 3rd quar-
ter of 2015 (compared to 5% since 2011). Meanwhile, to 
enhance the availability of money and credit, the Cen-
tral Bank dropped the reserve requirements from 2% 
to 0.5%, keeping the other parameters of the interest 
rate corridor unchanged: 0.1 % floor and 5% ceiling 
(see Table 2 on p. 10). Under these conditions, further 
devaluation of the manat and inflation were forecast in 
the 4th quarter of 2015.
If this policy were successful, it was expected that an 
increase in the quantity of domestic investment could 
decrease the supply of the manat to be exchanged into 
foreign currency (and into the US dollar, in particular) 
1 For further information on the strategic view and govern-
ment’s main priorities, see the development concept “Azerbai-
jan 2020: Look into the future”, http://www.president.az/files/
future_en.pdf
over the long term and that this fall in supply would 
appreciate the real exchange rate (by increasing the value 
of the manat).2 However, private agents’ incentives for 
unofficial dollarization seemed not to be considered, and 
this resulted in the ineffectiveness of expansionary mon-
etary policy in further stimulating domestic investment.
Unofficial dollarization exerted a  contraction-
ary effect, i.e., it led to a reduction in official foreign 
exchange reserves and the money base in manat. Expec-
tations of continuous devaluation and inflation fright-
ened the population into converting their deposits from 
the manat into US dollars, which increased demand for 
US dollars and created the conditions for further devalu-
ation of the manat.3 This also led to a mismatch between 
deposits and bank loans. Consequently, in contrast to 
our hypothesis, a reduction in the money multiplier was 
observed (see Table 2 on p. 10). Over time, triggered 
by a fall in foreign exchange reserves, the broad money 
supply M3 (money in the hands of people, demand and 
time deposits in the manat and foreign currency) also 
decreased (see Table 2 on p. 10).
Adopting the Managed Floating Exchange 
Rate Regime
Meanwhile, the Central Bank attempted to preserve the 
value of the manat and defended it against the effect 
of falling oil prices by spending its foreign exchange 
reserves. Nevertheless, continuous declines in oil prices 
and foreign exchange reserves brought about the second 
major devaluation of national currency against the US 
dollar in the 4th quarter of 2015 (approximately 47%) 
and challenged the adoption of the managed floating 
exchange rate regime in Azerbaijan. Based on the fun-
damental factors determining supply and demand ratio 
in the currency market, the advantage of the floating 
exchange rate regime is that it allows the economy to 
neutralize the negative consequences of global shocks 
and stimulates the development of the local financial 
market.
2 As long as the ownership and internationalization advantages 
of domestic firms are not sufficient to invest abroad, it is irrele-
vant to consider the serious detrimental effect of exchange rate 
appreciation on exports.
3 In contrast to unofficial dollarization, “The main attraction of 
full dollarization is the elimination of the risk of a sudden, sharp 
devaluation of the country’s exchange rate. This may allow the 
country to reduce the risk premium attached to its international 
borrowing. Dollarized economies could enjoy a higher level of 
confidence among international investors, lower interest rate 
spreads on their international borrowing, reduced fiscal costs, 
and more investment and growth.” Berg A., and Borenzstein E., 
IMF Working Paper No. 00/50, 2000, <https://www.imf.org/
external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=3486.0>
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Tightening Monetary Policy and Addressing 
Novelty
As a  fourth challenge, to prevent further devaluation 
of the manat and to keep inflation under control, the 
Central Bank cut its currency loose and began to pursue 
a tightening monetary policy. In this regard, increasing 
the refinancing rate from 3% to 5% and then to 7% in 
March 2016 is understandable (see Table 3 on p. 11). It 
was also one of the steps taken toward decreasing the 
dollarization incentives in the economy and increasing 
the population’s confidence in the national currency 
because high refinancing rates can lead to increases in 
deposits. A high interest rate initially might discour-
age domestic investment, given that the turmoil in the 
financial sector has already decreased the confidence of 
the population and domestic investors (declining growth 
rates of loans in 2014 and 2015). On the other hand, it 
leads to increases in the opportunity costs of holding 
national currency and can also decrease the incentive 
for the population to convert the manat to the US dol-
lar and stimulate them to increase their manat deposits. 
This activity can result in growing bank credits in the 
manat and push down the interest rate in the long term.
Financial Liberalization and Globalization
Due to the financial turmoil, unofficial dollarization, 
and reduction in the money base, the growth rate of 
loans contracted substantially in 2014 and 2015. The 
growth rate of loans by private banks contracted from 
24% in 2013 to 22% in 2014 and 16 % in 2015. In the 
meantime, the growth rate of loans by private banks with 
foreign capital was 35% in 2013 followed by 21% and 15 
% in 2014 and 2015, respectively. Although the growth 
rate of loans by state-owned banks contracted from 28% 
in 2013 to 16% in 2014, it showed 19% growth in 2015 
due to government intervention (see Table 3 on p. 11). 
Furthermore, since early 2016, the CBA has revoked the 
licenses of 7 banks (out of 42 total banks) and aimed to 
consolidate the banking sector. According to the CBA, 
these banks could not fulfill their obligations to credi-
tors or manage their activities prudentially.
The fifth challenge facing the CBA should be liber-
alizing the financial sector and creating favorable condi-
tions for the entry of foreign banks. The share of foreign 
banks (with 100% foreign ownership) in total loans is 
approximately 7%. The share of private banks with for-
eign capital was approximately 29% in 2015 and 26% 
in 2016 (where private banks’ share was approximately 
60%). (See Table 3 on p. 11). This is a clear indication 
of the weak role of foreign-owned banks in Azerbaijan. 
To promote economic growth through external fund-
ing to local firms, there is an urgent need for financial 
liberalization, for creating favorable conditions for for-
eign bank entry, and for improving domestic banks’ 
competitiveness.
The effects of a tightening monetary policy and the 
credit response of private banks depend on the own-
ership of individual banks. The role of foreign banks 
can be of crucial importance in monetary policy trans-
mission, as they are less responsive to domestic mone-
tary policy and also more reactive to changes in foreign 
financial conditions. In comparison to the refinancing 
rate of 7% in Azerbaijan, the rate in the Eurozone is 
approximately 0.05% (in 2015), which clearly indicates 
that the price of international funds is much cheaper 
abroad than in Azerbaijan. With the abundant pres-
ence of foreign-owned banks, the interest rate in Azer-
baijan would not be expected to be so high. Therefore, 
an increased presence of foreign-owned banks in the 
banking system and the possibility of access to cheaper 
international funds can decrease the credit response of 
private banks to changes in domestic monetary policy. 
According to recent research conducted by the IMF (on 
the case of East Asian economies), state-owned banks 
responded more negatively to an increasing rate than 
private banks, and as expected, loans by foreign-owned 
banks increased.
Conclusion: Macroeconomic Prospects, 
Opportunities and Risks
The CBA has spent more than half of its foreign exchange 
reserves to maintain the level of the manat. Supported 
by the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ), the CBA 
continues holding foreign exchange auctions to help 
banks by selling dollars in exchange for manat (while 
simultaneously pursuing a  tightening monetary pol-
icy). This is a short-term measure that offers little hope 
in the face of prevailing international and domestic eco-
nomic pressures.
On the other hand, from an economic theory per-
spective on long-term sustainability, the devaluation of 
the national currency has created better economic pros-
pects and opportunities, accompanied by exogenous and 
endogenous risk factors.
When the manat was devalued, its value declined rel-
ative to the value of other currencies such as the US Dol-
lar and Euro. This exchange rate movement has poten-
tial implications for foreign direct investment (FDI). It 
reduces production costs in Azerbaijan relative to those 
in foreign investor countries, thereby enhancing Azer-
baijan’s location advantage for foreign investors contem-
plating investment projects in Azerbaijan. A depreciated 
exchange rate can attract FDI concentrated on import 
substitution (producing goods previously imported) and 
export promotion (seeking new sources of inputs). In 
turn, higher foreign capital inflow can compensate for 
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weak domestic investment and eventually push down 
interest rates.
However, the deteriorating financial situation, the 
degree of uncertainty surrounding this situation and 
exchange rates, an expected tightening of monetary pol-
icy in the United States,4 and weak institutional qual-
ity and government effectiveness5 are not only barriers 
to foreign capital inflows to the non-oil sector but also 
obstacles that can aggravate the contraction of domestic 
credit and external funding and increase foreign invest-
ment repatriation.
In particular, creditworthiness has decreased and 
investor risks have increased since the negative oil shocks. 
The “Euromoney” country risk assessment survey high-
lights elevated investment risks since the 3rd quarter of 
2014 (the risk score fell from 52.5 out of 100 in 2012 
to 47 in the 4th quarter of 2015; a lower score indicates 
higher risk.)
Therefore, in an attempt to reduce fluctuations in the 
balance of payments under the floating exchange rate 
regime, the Azerbaijani government should accelerate 
the implementation of its adopted strategic economic 
development plan, reinforce financial stability to create 
a safer and sounder financial sector (to enhance credibil-
ity and monetary policy effectiveness), implement cred-
ible fiscal reform, stimulate domestic investment, and 
offer location advantages to foreign investors.
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Table 1: Selected Economic Indicators for Azerbaijan (mln. USD)
Q1 
2013
Q2 
013
Q3 
2013
Q4 
2013
Q1 
2014
Q2 
2014
Q3 
2014
Q4 
2014
Q1 
2015
Q2 
2015
Q3 
2015
Q4 
2015
Q1 
2016
SOFAZ 
revenue % 
GDP
22.5 20.9 13.6
Current 
account
 428 2,320 2809  3,276 3,333 3,166  2,793 1,139  108 -45  177 na na
Foreign 
trade bal-
ance
5,906 4,578 4,924  5,428 5,544 5584  5,080 2,720 1,758 2000 1,544 na na
Export 8,289 7,571 7,950  7,947 7,504 8,090  7,338 5,328 4,250 4427 3,646 na na
- Oil-gas 
sector 7,842 7,116 7,588  7,458 7,139 7,661  6,952 4,875  3,797 4,053 3,357 na na
- Other 
sectors  447  455  362  489  365  429  386  453  453 374  289 na na
Import 2,383 2993 3,026 2,520 1,960 2,506 2,258 2608 2,492 2,427 2102 na na
- Oil-gas 
sector 281 237  292 356 272 409 326 431 344 590 571 na na
- Other 
sectors 2,102 2,756 2,734 2,164 1,688 2,097 1,932 2,177 2,148 837 531 na na
FDI 1,420 1,547 1,678 1,646 1,911 1,956 1,951 2,231 1,845 1,956 1,936 na na
Repatria-
tion of in-
vestments
-841 -871 -952 -998 -970 -826 -858 -982 -829 -830 -856 na na
Official average exchange rates of the manat
US dollar 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 0.78 1.05 1.05 1.05 1.23 1.58
EURO 1.02 1.04 1.05 1.07 1.09 1.07 1.01 0.97 1.14 1.18 1.18 1.34 1.72
Inflation 
(CPI)
1.2 2.0 2.3 2.4 2.0 1.6 1.5 1.4 2.8 3.5 3.7 4 13.6
Sources: The Central Bank of Azerbaijan (CBA), the State Statistical Committee and State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan (SOFAZ).
Table 2: Key Monetary Indicators: Money Aggregates, Monetary Base (mln. AZN)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016/01
Money aggregates
M0 5,456 7,158 9,257 10,459 10,153 4,776 4,485
M1 6,839 8,796 11,122 12,737 12,830 6,897 6,273
M2 8,298 10,997 13,807 16,435 17,435 8,613 7,937
M3 10,528 13,903 16,775 19,290 21,566 21,319 19,965
- Net foreign assets 4,638 7,850 8,283 9,903 10,492 11,056 10,571
- Net domestic assets 5,889 6,054 8,492 9,387 11,076 10,263 9,393
Official FX reserves (mln. USD) 6,408 10,482 11,695 14,152 13,758 5,017 4,026
Money base (mln. Manat) 6,397 8,275 10,515 11,642 11,542 6,902 5,787
Money multiplier, M2/MB 1.30 1.33 1.31 1.41 1.51 1.25 1.37
Interest rates %
- Corridor floor 1 1 na na 0.5 (July)
0.1 (May)
0.1 2
- Corridor ceiling 7 7 na na 5 (July)
6 (May)
5 17 (March)
10 (Feb)
- Refinancing rate 3 5.25 (May)
5 (Feb.)
5 4.75 3.5 (July)
4.25 (May)
3 7 (March)
5 (Feb.)
Source: The Central Bank of the Republic of Azerbaijan.
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Table 3: The Structure of Loans to the Economy by Type of Credit Institution (mln. AZN)
2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016/01
Total loans 9,163 9,850 12,244 15,423 18,543 21,718 21,186
State-owned banks 3,902 3,300 4,137 5,300 6,144 7,289 7,707
Private banks 5,070 6,299 7,786 9,689 11,874 13,863 12,884
- with foreign capital 2,306 3,002 3,394 4,613 5,580 6,394 55,944
 as % of total loans 25 30 28 30 30 29 26
- with 100% foreign capital 464 586 759 1,035 1,389 1,565 1,546
 as % of total loans 5 6 6 7 8 7 7
Non-credit bank institutions 192 251 321 433 525 566 596
Source: The Central Bank of the Republic of Azerbaijan
Lower Oil Revenues, Higher Public Debt: The Fiscal Policy Implications of 
Low Oil Prices in Azerbaijan
By Kenan Aslanli, Baku
Abstract
This article examines fiscal policy and the main parameters of Azerbaijan’s fiscal position in the context of 
the severe constraints (namely, reduced budget revenues and cuts in government spending) posed by the 
decline in crude oil prices. Azerbaijan’s fiscal balances have deteriorated considerably as crude oil prices have 
tumbled. A worsening of Azerbaijan’s fiscal balance could gradually contribute to an increase in the pub-
lic debt burden and threaten fiscal sustainability in the long term. The sovereign wealth fund of Azerbaijan, 
SOFAZ, now has very limited profits from the sale of oil, and will contribute less to the fiscal revenues of the 
state as a consequence. The national state-owned oil-gas company, SOCAR, temporarily cancelled its plans 
for a new oil-gas refining and petrochemical complex because of the rapid fall in crude oil prices. However, 
at the same time, the new low oil price environment also offers an opportunity to boost a new wave of fis-
cal and public administration reforms in Azerbaijan.
Summary of the Fiscal Implications of 
Lower Crude Oil Prices
The drop in oil prices and resultant waves of devalua-
tion hit Azerbaijan’s economy and fiscal balance espe-
cially hard by diminishing oil revenue inflows to the 
fiscal system and decreasing budget incomes. Oil, gas 
and mineral revenues accounted for more than 77% of 
Azerbaijani budget revenue in 2014,1 and low oil prices 
affected almost every aspect of the country’s fiscal pol-
icy. Fiscal policy adjustments made in response to the 
1 Azerbaijan EITI Report for 2014, <https://eiti.org/files/azerbi 
ajian_eiti_report_2014.pdf>
new reality include changes in governmental budget rev-
enues; changes in the structure of governmental budget 
spending, including cuts to capital and recurrent expen-
ditures; new sources of financing for the budget deficit; 
changes in the State Oil Fund’s (SOFAZ) assets; and 
changes in the State Oil Company’s (SOCAR) opera-
tions. Both revenue and spending aspects of fiscal pol-
icy have encountered severe constraints due to low oil 
prices, namely the shortfall in budget revenues and cuts 
in government spending. Current fiscal balances have 
deteriorated amid plunging oil prices.
Decreased crude oil and natural gas production cou-
pled with lower crude oil prices led to a contraction of 
